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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGREEMENTS IN
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
Susan Ridgley
Abstract: In an environmental protection agreement, local government regulatory
authorities and the regulated industry enter into a binding written agreement that
specifies limits on pollution and supplements the applicable regulatory requirements.
They have been utilized in Japan for over twenty years. This Comment discusses the
content and practical uses of these agreements as they have been used in Japan, and
postulates their legal status under three theories: that such agreements are relational
social contracts; that they are informal administrative guidance; and that they are civil
contracts. The legal character of environmental protection agreements in Japan has never
been well-defined, primarily because of lack of litigation. Therefore, this Comment
analogizes from the manner in which courts in both Japan and the United States have
treated similar land use development agreements. It concludes that environmental
protection agreements in the United States could be a valuable supplement to the current
regulatory system, as long as agreements are truly voluntary and that some justifiable
relationship exists between the conditions imposed and the public good.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite differences in legal tradition and culture, the United States
and Japan share distinct similarities in their systems of environmental
control. These two industrial democracies have developed complex and
analogous pollution control laws, regarded as models by the rest of the
world. This is partly due to common trends in industrial evolution. Both
nations are heavily industrialized, in transition from older, polluting
industries, such as chemical manufacturing and metal smelting, to high
technology and service industries with more diffuse environmental effects.
The moralistic grass-roots citizen movements that arose in both countries
during the early 1970s generated a wave of new environmental laws. 1
These laws share common assumptions and structures. They are both
grounded on the "polluter pays principle,"2 have adopted strict and
prescriptive standards, and rely on technology-forcing, "best available
control" regulatory strategies. Both Japan and the United States use a two-
I For a discussion of the evolution and impact of citizen politics on environmental law in Japan, see
MARGARET A. MCKEAN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST AND CITIZEN POLITICS IN JAPAN (1981) and JULIAN
GRESSER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN 3-50 (1981).2 This is the general belief that industry should shoulder the financial and technical burdens of
controlling contamination, while government should closely monitor the result.
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tiered administrative system wherein the national government primarily sets
policies and standards, and the state or prefecture primarily implements
them.
These overarching similarities emphasize important differences
between the two nations' approaches to environmental control, such as
assumptions concerning relationships between government, industry and the
general public, and the means used to achieve these strict pollution control
standards. In Japan, the national laws function as a "floor," while local
government negotiates much stricter, site-specific particularized standards.
Japanese businesses exhibit a higher tolerance for variations in the
regulatory requirements between different localities, even within the same
industry. In Japan, a "fair" standard is not necessarily one which treats
everyone the same, but rather one which takes into account all the unique
local preferences and pecularities.
3
The United States is now facing the consequences of its regulatory
choices; the limits of its so-called "command and control" system of
regulation are well documented.4  There is an ongoing debate within the
United States (and in Europe) about what alternatives exist, how to most
effectively and efficiently regulate industrial pollution. Two main schools
of thought have emerged. One school proposes replacing or supplementing
command and control regulation with "indirect regulation," i.e., they
support the use of economic incentives and market-oriented regulations to
send pricing signals that channel industry choices in environmentally
preferable ways.5  The other school advocates the increased use of self-
3
This acceptance of particularized solutions reflects historically prevalent attitudes in Japan about
the role of law in society. "The notion that a justice measured by universal standards can exist independent
of the wills of the disputants is apparently alient to the traditional habit of the Japanese people." Takeyoshi
Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY 41, 50 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963).4
"Command and control" regulations are those that require a specific action by a regulated entity,
usually by meeting stated technological standards of pollution, often the best available technology. Critics
assert that this system has tended to result in a profusion of detailed laws and regulations, which consume
precious money and energy through high transaction costs. The laws, developed in a fragmented way,
have resulted in fragmented programs that often allow cross-media transfer of pollutants, while the level of
regulation is not well-correlated with the level of actual environmental risk. See generally SCIENCE
ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. EPA, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SERIOUS
REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE (1986).5 Marketable rights (e.g., the Clean Air Act's emissions-credit trading system) and various state fee
systems have been the primary uses of indirect regulation in the United States. See generally Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
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regulation, whereby government shares either regulatory power,
enforcement power, or both with the regulated community.6  Experiments
with self-regulation include the voluntary adoption of industrial standards
(such as ISO 9000 and ISO 14000)7 and regulation development through
structured negotiation ("reg-neg").8
Environmental protection agreements, which contain elements of
both indirect regulation and self-regulation, may be a viable third option in
the United States. In an environmental protection agreement, government
regulatory authorities and the regulated industry enter into a binding written
agreement specifying comprehensive limitations on pollution that either
supplant or supplement the otherwise applicable regulatory requirements.
9
Like indirect regulation, management via environmental protection
agreements depends on decentralized, independent choices by businesses
pursuing their own economic and social goals, which, in the aggregate,
shape environmental policy outcomes. Like self-regulation, environmental
protection agreements involve the adoption of a regulatory standard through
voluntary negotiation. Yet, these agreements appear to be based on contract
law, an old and universal form of law.
In Japan, such environmental protection agreements, called "k6gai
boshi ky6tei", I0 have been extensively used for the last twenty years. In
6 Eric Bregman & Arthur Jacobson, Environmental Performance Review: Self-Regulation in
Environmental Law, 16 CARDOZo L. REV. 465, 466 (1994).7
ISO 9000 is an international voluntary standard, developed under the auspices of the International
Organization for Standardisation ("ISO"), that sets out a recommended quality assurance system for
adoption by industries. It is applicable to a wide range of industries, rather than to a specific product as are
the more typical technical ISO standards for chemical quality, information processing, photography,
mechanical engineering, and so forth. ISO 14000 is a similar voluntary standard, currently in the process
of being developed, which will consists of a recommended environmental management system,
incorporating elements of life-cycle assessment, internal auditing, and eco-labelling. See generally Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, Shifing the Point of Regulation: The International Organization for Standardization and
Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22 ECOLOGY L. Q. 479 (1995).8 For a refreshingly critical discussion of the reg-neg approach, see Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1207-12(1994 .
The definition is one used by Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Contracts and Covenants: A
United States Perspective, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS: NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR A
REALISTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY? 143 (Jan M. van Dunne ed., 1993).l0
"Kgai boshi kydtei" can variously be translated as "environmental protection agreement,"
"pollution prevention agreement, "pollution control agreement," or "public nuisance prevention
agreement." Because the terms "pollution prevention" and "pollution control" have legally specific
meanings in the United States, this Comment will use the term "kyjtei" (meaning, simply, "agreement") to
describe the Japanese form of environmental protection agreements.
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fact, as of October 1992, over 40,000 companies had signed agreements
("kydtei") with prefectures, cities and towns.1 1  Eminently useful and
adaptable, on average about 1,600-2,000 new agreements are developed
each year. 12 Kyrtei are the basic building blocks of Japan's site-specific,
particularized form of environmental control. They have been instrumental
in improving environmental and economic effectiveness, while stimulating
preventative rather than remedial technologies. 13 This is so even though in
general there are no statutes or regulations that define or require the
development of kyrtei.
This Comment explores the feasibility of using environmental
protection agreements, the equivalent of kyrtei, in the United States. The
primary issue is enforceability. If polluters are under no legal obligation,
why would they agree to voluntarily accept more stringent standards? If
they do agree, what prevents them from reneging on the agreement if
compliance with it becomes expensive or inconvenient? Without an
authorizing statute, it is critical to determine whether the environmental
protection agreement is a contract, enforceable under traditional common
law principles, or merely a form of very specific agency guidance and
therefore potentially unenforceable in a court of law. Unfortunately, the
enforceability of kyi5tei in Japan remains somewhat of a puzzle despite their
common usage, primarily because widespread compliance with these
voluntary agreements has resulted in a paucity of case law.
This Comment first discusses the content and practical uses of kyrtei
in Japan, as well as briefly outlining the legal basis for the government's
authority to negotiate. It next examines three theories on the legal character
of kyrtei: they may be an expression of a social relationship, without legal
meaning; they may be a form of informal, site-specific administrative
guidance, with legal relevance under some circumstances; or depending on
II
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT ("OECD"), OECD
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: JAPAN 103 (1994). This document cites the most recent (1991-
1992) Japan Environment Agency figures for the breakdown of kyltei by type, industry sector, and party
composition. The data for 1971-1981 is compiled in Yoshikazu Shibaike, Guidelines and Agreements in
Administrative Law, 19 LAW IN JAPAN 63, 77 (Russell Allen Yeomans trans., 1983). The breakdowns for
each year between 1983 and 1990 are individually reported in the Japan Environment Agency's annual
report for that year. JAPAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN (1983-
1990).
12 BRENDAN F.D. BARRETT & RIKI THERIVEL, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT
IN JAPAN 79, 89 n.25 (1991).
13 OECD, supra note 11, at 104.
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one's analysis and the facts of the case, ky6tei may actually be a fully
enforceable civil contract.
"Environmental protection agreement" is the term used in this
Comment to denote the potential U.S. equivalent of ky6tei. In order to
evaluate their enforceability, this Comment analogizes from similar
agreements in the land use arena in Japan and the United States, looking
first at the judicial treatment of Outline Guidance 14 in Japan, and then at its
U.S. counterpart, the development agreement. The legitimacy of the
development agreement implicates the reserved powers doctrine, and the
contracts and takings clauses of the U.S. Constitution. This Comment
concludes that, based on the development agreement analogy and the
limited treatment of ky6tei by Japanese courts, it may be possible in the
United States to legally enforce a carefully crafted environmental protection
agreement under certain conditions: (1) the company voluntarily consents
to the adoption of more stringent requirements than are legally required, and
(2) some justifiable relationship exists between the conditions imposed and
the public good.
II. NATURE AND USES OF KYOTEI
A ky6tei is an agreement between a private interest party and a public
interest party, designed to control to various degrees the present and future
behavior of both parties. The private interest party is always a
company/entrepreneur, most frequently a large company, 15 or in some cases
an industrial organization representing a group of similar companies. The
public interest party might be a prefecture, Ia municipality (i.e., city or
town), a citizen organization, or some combination of these.17 Two-party
14
The Japanese term is y6kc shido. Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative
Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 923,
931 (1984).15 Local governments have targeted large businesses for efficiency reasons. For example, in Himeji
City (population 450,000) over 70% of the air pollution is controlled via kyjtei with just 3 businesses.
Interview with Mr. Kuroda, Section Chief, Environmental Protection of Himeji City, in Himeji, Japan (Jan.
1993).6
A prefecture is analogous to a U.S. state; there are 47 in Japan.
17 Shibaike, supra note 11, at 76-79.
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agreements between a company and a municipality are the most common
type of ky6tei, 18 and will be the primary focus of this Comment.
Three-party agreements also exist. A prefecture may join with the
negotiating municipality in signing the agreement, to reinforce the
municipality's legitimacy. Alternately, citizen groups may join the
municipality, to symbolize community approval. 19 However, because other
commentators have examined the phenomena of citizen-driven
agreements, 20 they will not be examined in depth here. This Comment will
also not address agreements between companies and citizen groups which
are designed solely to compensate victims for the effects of past pollution
through the pollution dispute resolution laws. 21  Rather, it will focus on
those kydtei which attempt to prevent pollution by influencing the future
behavior of the polluter.
A. Private Enterprises' Commitments
In theory, a ky6tei could cover almost anything; the Japanese word
for "pollution" (k~gai) literally means "public nuisance," something that
disrupts the smooth flow of civil life, and encompasses a social rather than
scientific flavor.2 2  In general, however, ky6tei typically focus on
environmental problems which are likely to impact the health of citizens or
the aesthetics of the local community.
18 In 1991/92, only nine percent of the ky6tei were without government involvement, i.e., solely
between citizen groups and private enterprises. OECD, supra note I1, at 104.19 The closest U.S. equivalent to these citizen-driven ky6tei are the mandatory negotiations between
companies seeking to site hazardous waste disposal facilities and the targetted communities, required under
some states' laws. The end product of the negotiation is a contract or addendum to a permit, enforceable
by the courts, that specifies limitations on construction, design and operation of the facility. For an
interesting comparison of these hazardous waste siting agreements to ky5tei,. see Eckard Rehbinder,
Ecological Contracts: Agreements between Polluters and Local Communities, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION
147, 151 (Gunther Teubner et al. eds., 1994).20 See, e.g., Rehbinder, supra note 19. See also Geoffrey W.G. Leane, Environmental Contracts-A
Lesson in Democracy from the Japanese, 25[2] U.B.C. L. REV. 361, 368 (1991).21 See GRESSER, supra note 1, at 325-46.
22 Japanese students, asked to give examples of what they consider major environmental problems,
have given answers such as "bad breath" and "old men on bicycles." The reasoning is that bad breath is
objectionable, and old men on bicycles disrupt pedestrian traffic, cause injuries, and generally rend the
fabric of society, as does air pollution. Douglas C. McGill, Scour Technology's Stain with Technology,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at 32.
VOL. 5 No. 3
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONAGREEMENTS
While the early agreements contained only abstract promises by the
company to reduce pollution and compensate for damages, later agreements
are more explicit about obligations and sanctions. 23  They contain specific
requirements that are significantly more stringent than what is legally
required. 24 The formality of the negotiation process itself has also evolved
over time, as has the difficulty in administering the resulting agreement.
25
Ky6tei may include limits not only for air and water emissions, but
also for industrial waste, noise, or offensive odors. The requirements can
often be quite detailed and intrusive, specifying such things as facility
design, the use of raw materials and fuels, the type or volume of product
produced, working hours, emission monitoring, and/or reporting
requirements. 26  By including renegotiation clauses that require use of the
most recent technology, 7 ky6tei compel periodic readjustments to maintain
these high standards.
Many ky5tei directly address citizen concerns or public relations.
Some include a blanket liability clause, whereby the company promises to• 28
compensate any citizen who is harmed by the company actions. Ky6tei
might also include a "confer in good faith" clause, 29whereby the company
23
GRESSER, supra note I, at 248.
24
Emission limits may be fifty percent stricter than the legal standard. Rehbinder, supra note 19, at
151.
25
The changes in style and content of the ky6tei are partially a function of the increasing
sophistication of the instrument itself, and partially a reflection of the unique convergence of politics in
each locality. The experiences of the City of Tokyo, Chiba Prefecture, Kanagawa Prefecture, Kawasaki
City, and Yokohama City are described in Kazuo Yamanouchi & Kiyoharu Otsubo, Agreements in
Pollution Prevention: Overview and One Example, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN JAPAN 221, 223-26
(Shigeto Tsuru & Helmut Weidner eds., 1989).
Shibaike, supra note 11, at 80. English translations of actual ky5tei can be found in:
Yamanouchi & Otsubo, supra note 25, at 237-45 (Kagoshima Prefecture and Kyushu Electric Co.);
GRESSER, supra note 1, at 399-404 (lwaki City and the Japan Hydrogen Engineering Corp.; Himeji City,
Hy6go Prefecture, and Kansai Electric Co.; lbaraki Nuclear Plant.
Helmut Weidner, Japan: The Success and Limitations of Technocratic Environmental Policy, 14
POL'Y & POL. 43, 57 (1986).28 This sort of sweeping statement, which may strike an American lawyer as suicidal, is actually an
acknowledgement of the prevailing liability law in Japan. The Law for Compensation of Pollution-Related
Health Injury, passed in 1973, moved beyond the concept of strict liability to recognize the responsibility
of the polluting industry to compensate the victims for their misfortune, through individual payments for
medical expenses and lost earnings. Although the law itself limits the payments to certain diseases,
victims, and regions, the concept of victim compensation has been picked up in kydtei negotiations. See
GRESSER, supra note 1, at 290-318.29
"Confer in good faith" clauses are not unique to ky6tei. They are often used in Japanese contracts,
reflecting a belief that all contracts are ultimately tentative and subject to subsequent revision through ad
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promises to negotiate any future disputes directly with citizens.30 In some
cases, citizens groups who want to directly monitor the company's
environmental performance may obtain assurances that representatives will
have the right to conduct site inspections or have access to privileged
information.31
Kydtei often, but not always, specify sanctions in the event of breach.
The "sanction" might be no more than a statement that the company will
immediately correct the problem that led to the offending emission.
However, the agreement could specify much more draconian sanctions,
such as giving the local government the authority to curtail or completely
suspend operation of the facility. 32 Examples of other specified sanctions
include a promise by the company to be fully liable for any and all
environmental damages arising from the breach; interruption of municipal
water supply services; or a disclosure requirement, requirin the
embarrassing details of the violations to be published 
in a newspaper.
B. Local Government 's Commitments
1. Government's Authority to Enter into Ky6tei
Local governments in Japan are generally subordinate to the central
government, which maintains tight control over fiscal affairs, and a
corresponding control over all aspects of government work. For historical,
practical and political reasons, the field of environmental control remains
the outstanding exception to this norm of centralized control. Local
governments have carved out a clear niche of authority in environmental
protection, and have been more innovative and assertive than the central
government.
34
The original source of the local governments' authority is article 94
of the Japanese Constitution, which permits local governments to enact their
hoc consultation as necessary. Takeyoshi Kawashima, Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 7 LAW
IN JAPAN 1, 16-17 (1974).30 Yamanouchi & Otsubo, supra note 25, at 226.
31 GRESSER, supra note 1, at 249.32 GRESSER, supra note I, at 248.
33 Yamanouchi & Otsubo, supra note 25, at 226.34 Hidefumi Imura, Administration of Pollution Control at Local Level, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
IN JAPAN 60-61 (Shigeto Tsuru & Helmut Weidner eds., 1989).
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own regulations.35  Subsequently, article 14 of the Local Autonomy Law
authorized local legislation "not inconsistent" with national law.36  After
World War II, a few local governments enacted environmental ordinances,
but generally they were not effectively enforced.37 Then during the 1960s,
widespread dissatisfaction with ambient pollution levels, and the success of
four famous environmental dispute cases,38 caused a radical change in
public attitude. Local governments, under pressure by citizen's groups to
control the polluting industries in their jurisdictions, found that the national
regulations were inadequate.
39
The 1970 revisions to the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution
Prevention decided this clash over environmental authority, by clarifying
that local governments have the power to promulgate their own standards.
Today, while the national government sets goals and policies, and develops
the baseline pollution control standards, prefectures enforce and implement
the national standards. Local governments are allowed great discretion in
environmental regulation, with power to pass their own, more stringent
ordinances, develop industry-specific informal administrative guidance, or
negotiate individual ky6tei. 41
2. Content of Government Commitments
A municipality can make explicit or implicit promises in return for
commitments from private enterprises. By and large, local governments
control access to land, especially large tracts of land suitable for industrial
development. For the last twenty years, prefectures and large cities in Japan
35
"Local public entities shall have the right to manage their property, affairs and administration and
to enact their own regulations within law." Article 94 (Sup. Ct. of Japan, CONST. OF JAPAN, 1972).36 Article 14 of the Local Autonomy Law states: "Ordinary local public entities shall have the right
to enact their own regulations concerning the subjects provided in art. 2(2), provided they are not
inconsistent with the statutes and orders." Chihdjichihd, Law No. 67, as amended (1947).37 George F. Curran Il, Pacific Rim Environmental Regulation: A Western Perspective of Several
Countries'Environmental Liability Laws, 3 J. INT'L L.& PRAC. 47 (1994).38 These were the Kumamoto Minamata disease, Niigata Minimata disease, Toyama Itai-itai disease,
and Yokkaichi Asthma cases. See generally Frank K. Upham, Litigation and Moral Consciousness in
Japan: An Interpretive Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution Suits, LAW & SOC'Y, Summer 1976, at 579;
MCKEAN, supra note 1, at 20-70.39 Curran, supra note 37, at 3.
40 Law No. 132 (1967), amended by Law No. 132 (1970) and No. 88 (1971).
41 Shiro Kawashima, A Survey of Environmental Law and Policy in Japan, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 231, 239 (1995).
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have been "creating" prime land by filling in portions of the shoreline or
even building complete offshore islands, which is then sold in exchange for
significant concessions. Even when the city does not have land to sell, it
nevertheless retains land use or land zoning powers, and therefore can
bargain with access concessions.
42
Another frequently used lever is access to the subsidized public
service infrastructure, such as sewage treatment, water supply, or power,
which is controlled by the local municipality. Because environmental
control is so decentralized in Japan, 43 it is easy for the local government to
directly link delivery of services to pollution control requirements. 44  The
pre-permitting application and review process is relatively simple; the
prefecture assumes that the developer will comply with all requirements.
Thereafter, an elaborate monitoring, sampling and inspecting system assures
on-going compliance.45  Thus, obtaining building and environmental
permits is an absolutely pivotal step, because it represents a promise of
compliance with all environmental and land use laws and is the key to
access for public services. A government agency can withold these services
directly, by denying the permit; in some cases, a simple threat of delay or
eventual retaliation can be sufficient inducement.46
Another primary bargaining instrument is the implicit promise of
public support. Good public relations are essential in a society where a
positive reputation brings both high quality employees willing to sign
lifetime employment contracts and customers willing to conclude business
42
One of the first kyjtei to be developed was in response to the siting of a new power plant in
Yokohama in 1964. Local citizens and city officials were concerned about the impacts of the proposal on
the surrounding neighborhoods. The city inserted a clause into the Reclaimed Land Transfer Act,
authorizing the enforcement of more stringent standards. See McKEAN, supra note 1, at 149; GRESSER,
supra note 1, at 248.
Prefectures and municipalities are in complete control of permitting decisions, while the national
government, unlike in the United States, is uninvolved. Thomas S. Mackey & Jim S. Hart, A Comparison
of US. and Japanese Environmental Laws Governing Emissions From Major Industrial Facilities, 6
TRANSNAT'L LAW 579, 584 (1993).
44 Compare the situation in the United States, where a new or expanding facility must obtain
separate air, wastewater, stormwater, shoreline and hazardous waste management permits (as applicable),
zoning approvals, and building permits, each individually negotiated with multiple parts of agencies at
different levels of the local, state, and federal government.45 Mackey & Hart, supra note 43, at 584-85.
46 "As a matter of public mentality, people fear that some disadvantage might be imposed on them
tomorrow because they fight with the government officials today." 1964 REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE (Gydsei tetsuzuki ni kan suru htkoku), quoted in Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Yasuhiro Fujita,
The Right to Fair Hearing in Japanese Administrative Law, 45 WASH. L. REV. 273, 321 (1970).
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deals based on a handshake. More dramatically, outraged citizens have
been known to block the construction of unpopular facilities, especially
during the early years of the environmental movement in Japan.47  A
company which maintains a positive relationship with the local government
can expect it to act as a buffer for citizen complaints.48 Companies
frequently cite public approval as the most important reason for entering
into kyotei.49
C. Uses of Ky6tei
Kydtei are typically used in three situations: when an existing
regulatory structure is inadequate; when responsibility for pollution must be
collectively assigned; and when there are transboundary disputes.
1. To Fill Gaps in Regulation or Authority
The most common situation in which kyjtei are used is when an
existing regulatory structure does not meet the local government's concerns.
One such "gap" occurs when a national statute or prefectural ordinance
preempts a city or town's ability to control the polluting behavior of a
particular business within its geographic jurisdiction. The city or town
might be dissatisfied with the existing law's efficacy or its enforcement, and
might want to tailor the law to reflect local environmental conditions or
citizen sensitivities. A ky6tei, which needs no statutory authority for
47
Vociferous anti-development activity continues in such highly publicized cases as the Kyoto
Second Outer Circular Highway and Narita Airport, now nearing its second decade of protest. BARRET-r &
THERIVEL, supra note 12, at 19.48 For example, representatives from Shionogi & Co, Inc., an agrochemical manufacturing facility in
Ako City, Hy6go Prefecture, described the benefits of the city acting as mediator. They thought the city
provided the citizens with an easy, effective means for complaint and action, while for the company, a way
to avoid dealing directly with individual groups of angry neighbors. Furthermore, they thought it would be
difficult to convince citizens of the safety and merits of proposed changes to the facility without a ky(5tei.
Interview with Takashi Wada, General Manager -of Ako plant and Yoshinobu Nakamoto, Section Chief,
Ako Department of Environmental Management, in Ako, Japan (Dec. 1992).
49
Interviews with Yasuo Kishi, Manager of Environmental Affairs, Kansai Electric Power Co., in
Kobe, Japan (1993); Mr. Kuroda, Section Chief, Environmental Protection of Himeji City, in Himeji, Japan
(1993 ;Tatuso Hiratani, Industrial Pollution Control Association of Japan, in Tokyo, Japan (1993).
For example, the city may want more strict air emission standards for an urban power plant, but
confronts the administrative problem that energy facilities are a major industry wholly under the regulatory
influence of Ministry of International Trade and Industry. This was the situation in one of the first kydtei
to be developed, between Yokohama City and the Tokyo Electric Power Company, previously referenced
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enactment, may fill this authority gap. The other type of "gap" is
regulatory: a company is unregulated under national or prefectural laws
because of its size or its type of emission, and the local government wants
to negotiate a kyi5tei to extend regulatory control over this previously
unregulated source.
2. To Assign Collective Responsibility
In addition to meeting effluent standards (i.e., quantitative limits for
particular types of pollutants), companies located in designated
geographical areas may be required to maintain conventional air and water
pollutant levels within regional limits.51  The prefecture must determine
how the burden of this so-called area-wide total pollutant load control or
"mass emission" system should be allocated among contributors. 52
Additional pollution from new facilities or expansions of existing facilities
could exceed the area-wide limits. Kyjtei may be used to assign and re-
assign collective responsibility for reducing the target pollutants. In some
cases, a business association or lead company might take responsibility for
negotiating which company or companies must reduce their pollutant levels.
supra note 42. For a detailed description of this kyttei's development, see Michio Hashimoto,
Administrative Guidance in Environmental Policy: Some Important Cases, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
JAPAN 252, 254-55 (Shigeto Tsuru & Helmut Weidner eds., 1989); GRESSER, supra note 1, at 248;
McKean, supra note 1, at 149.
51 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES OF JAPAN 32 (1977). The U.S. Clean Water contains a similar dichotomous concept: water
quality standards define the amount of a pollutant allowed in a particular water course, while effluent
limitations describe the amount of pollution that can legally be released from a specific source. See
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 252 (2d ed. 1994).
52 See Yamanouchi & Otsubo, supra note 25, at 233 (example of how area-wide standard was
calculated for Chiba Prefecture); GRESSER, supra note 1, at 255-6; BARRETT & THERIVEL, supra note 12,
at 77.
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3. To Manage Transboundary Pollution
Kyetei enable some uniformity of control when a polluter's emissions
cross jurisdictional boundaries. They can harmonize legal discrepancies
between public entities, without the need to rely on the unresponsive
national regulatory structure. 53 Ky~tei thus provide a useful complement to
regulations, and function as a type of treaty or compact.
D. Advantages
Ky6tei allow the city or town to deal with a polluter in their
community in a way that maximizes local control and flexibility. They do
not require the vote of local legislative bodies, in contrast to pollution
control ordinances which require legislative sanction. 54  Although initial
ky6tei negotiation is time-intensive, proponents claim that it is less time-
intensive than new legislation or regulation.5 5  Also, subsequent
enforcement is usually either unnecessary or significantly less resource-
intensive because of decreased social resistance.
56
There are numerous advantages for industry as well. Compared to a
system of national standards, ky6tei provide a company with an
unprecedented level of influence on how they are regulated, verging on self-
regulation. Additionally, ky6tei are a socially-accepted means for local
companies to publicly proclaim the positive steps taken to reduce their
harmful environmental impact in the community. This in turn helps their
position during discussions with the city or prefecture on related or
53 GRESSER, supra note 1, at 267, 461 n.128.
54 Yamanouchi & Otsubo, supra note 25, at 222.
55 Estimates for the length of time required to conclude a ky6tei negotiation range from one year, for
very complex projects, to only about a month. Interviews with Yoshinobu Nakamoto, Assistant Section
Chief, Department of Environmental Management and Pollution of Ako City, in Ako, Japan (Dec. 1992);
Mr. Kuroda, Section Chief, Environmental Protection of Himeji City, in Himeji, Japan (Dec. 1992).56 Common sense suggests that consensual mechanisms of lawmaking will always tend to have
higher compliance levels. Mediation studies in the United States have proven this assumption. For
example, studies of victim-offender mediation show that face-to-face negotiations can have a significant
impact on the likelihood of offenders successfully completing their restitution obligation to the victim
(81%), when compared to similar offenders who completed their restitution through court-administered
programs without mediation. MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER 155 (1994).57 Interview with Mr. Asao, Vice President of Environmental Health and.Safety, Daiseru Chemical
Co., in Himeji, Japan (Nov. 1992-Feb. 1993); Takashi Wada, General Manager, Shionogi & Co., Ltd., in
Ako, Japan (Nov. 1992-Feb. 1993).
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unrelated matters. Finally, a negotiated agreement, while not a freeze on
regulation, does assure some degree of long term consistency and
certainty--critical for business planning. Although the rules may change in
the future, they will not change unexpectedly.
Additional advantages of the ky5tei system accrue to both the
government and industry. Negotiation of a ky6tei provides a forum to
examine the impact of all sources of pollution from one facility, functioning
as a sort of multi-media audit. 59 Transaction costs and litigation expenses
are reduced because both parties agree in advance on the expected
requirements and compliance timetables. Perhaps most important, ky6tei
discussions often form the basis for further negotiations that result in the
development of a plant-wide pollution prevention plan. 60 These pollution
prevention plans set performance goals for each site, and thereby stimulate
innovation by creating an internal "market" for pollution prevention inside
each plant.
III. LEGAL CHARACTERIZATION OF KYOTE1
There are three views on the legal character of kyjtei. These
characterizations can critically affect the enforceability of these agreements
by Japanese (and potentially U.S.) courts. The first view is that they have
little, if any, legal meaning, being essentially a social phenomenon; these
may be termed "relational non-contracts." The second view is that they are
a form of informal administrative action, an inordinately detailed, site-
specific kind of bureaucratic advice. According to this view, ky6tei are like
"soft regulations," which are an agency's policy directives, equivalent to
rules, that limit the behavior of a regulated party. These may or may not be
enforceable. The final view is that kyjtei are legally enforceable contracts.
One reason for the ambiguous legal nature of these agreements is that
their structures and uses are so varied. From wholly private to wholly
public, ky6tei form a continuum based on their particular composition and
content.6 1 At one end are those ky6tei negotiated between private actors,
58 Id.; Rehbinder supra note 19, at 161.
59 The majority of agreements address wastewater management concerns; they also may address
noise air pollution, odor, fuels use, and so on. OECD, supra note 11, at 103.
A pollution prevention plan focuses not only on the emission standards but how these standards
will be met through changes in internal production processes. GRESSER, supra note 1, at 249.
61 This concept of ky5tei on a continuum originated from Shibaike, supra note 1I, at 87-88.
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e.g., companies and citizens. These resemble pure private contracts, in that
they are designed to benefit a small group of people, although in a domain
(environmental pollution) typically managed for the public interest. At the
other end of the continuum are kyrtei between a regulatory body
(prefectures) and a regulated industry clearly within the prefecture's
jurisdiction. These kydtei look like conditional permits, regulations or
merely administrative guidance. In the middle of the continuum are
numerous variations, wherein the local government acts as a representative
of citizen groups, or of regulatory agencies, or negotiates on its own behalf.
A. Ky6tei as Relational Non-Contracts
One view of kyetei is that they are relational agreements, rather than
legal instruments that define a right-duty relationship. 62 The primary goal
of a such a relational agreement is to formalize and publicize the all-
encompassing, dependent relationship between the polluting company and
the local community (as represented by the government). Such agreements
tend to have a high rate of compliance because of the relationship itself,
rather than because the instrument is enforceable in a court of law. One
commentor has noted:
in a society where compliance by a plant operator with the
formal norms is not in itself sufficient to be accepted by the
local community, because the community has a primarily extra-
legal value orientation, environmental agreements have the
function of a local 'social contract' that makes the operator of
the new facility a member of the community or concretises his
obligations towards it.
63
This view of kyrtei as a relational non-contract is particularly
appropriate in situations where the private enterprise is subject to
comprehensive, continuous economic and social regulation and support by
62
See J. TOSHIO SAWADA, SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT AND SUPERVENING EVENTS 225 (1968)
("Contracts [in Japan] are viewed not as a set of legal claims, but as an evidence of certain social or
personal relations."); Kawashima, supra note 29, at 7 ("When a Japanese makes an agreement with another
person, the goodwill and friendship that gave rise to the agreement is more important to him than the
agreement itself.").
63 Rehbinder, supra note 19, at 160.
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the government. In this situation, a congenial long term relationship with
the city or prefecture is essential. 64 Even when a business thinks that the
government requests are unreasonable, it would be hesitant to poison its
future relationship with the government by openly disputing in court the
enforceability of the agreement. The business is more likely to pursue a
politically-oriented solution, such as enlisting the support of its employees
or the general public, appealing to other businesses in the community, or
asking a favor of a local politician.
65
B. Kydtei as Site-Specific Administrative Guidance
A strong argument can be made that ky6tei are written responses to
administrative guidance, 66 specifically crafted for a particular situation, with
no force of law. Although frequently overlooked, much of the regulatory
work in any country is accomplished through informal guidance or advice
from an agency, solicited or unsolicited by the regulated party. In Japan,
the widespread use of administrative guidance is legendary: it is used to
implement nearly all bureaucratic policy, whether or not expressed in
statute.67 Even in the United States, with its emphasis on agency adherence
to delineated procedures, the great bulk of government control of corporate
behavior (including polluting behavior) is accomplished through informal
agency action and mutual consent.
68
Administrative guidance has been the subject of extensive comment
by Western legal scholars,69 because of the curious fact that although it is
64
Surveyed industry officials have attested that they had the sense of being completely enveloped by
the governmental presence, and expressed real concern about "displeasing." GRESSER, supra note 1, at
268.
65
Young, supra note 14, at 951.
66 Administrative guidance (gy6sei shido-) is the term used for this informal process by which a local
or national government in Japan induces industry's voluntary cooperation and compliance. See Russell
Allen Yeomans, Administrative Guidance: A Peregrine View, 19 LAW IN JAPAN, 125, 129-37 (1986)
(extended analysis of translations of "gy6sei shid5," and differing interpretations of its meaning).
67 John 0. Haley, Administrative Guidance Versus Formal Regulation, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES
OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 107, IIi (Saxonhouse & Yamamura eds., 1986).68 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,
S.Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., I st Sess. 35 (1941), quoted in Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Informal Agency Actions and
US. Administrative Law-Informal Procedure in a Global Era, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 665, 667 (1994).69 To name only four: Steven M. Spaeth, Industrial Policy, Continuing Surveillance and Raised
Eyebrows: A Comparison of Informality in Administrative Procedure in Japan and the United States, 20
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the primary means used to control corporate behavior, it often has no legal
force or effect. The Japanese administrator, rather than using the "stick" of
enforcement, achieves most regulatory goals through social pressure and/or
"carrots" e.g., financial incentives which reward compliance. The only
limitation on an agency using administrative guidance is that it can not
violate the law.
70
1. Typical Bargaining Situations
Typically, informal guidance may stimulate voluntary business
commitments in two situations. In the first, generalized agency advice or
exhortations are given to the business community at large, and a particular
business then agrees to adopt them, because it makes good economic sense,
portrays a favorable public image, or both.7 ' There may be an element of
subtle social coercion, in that the advice is being promoted by a powerful
regulatory agency. Nevertheless, in general the resulting actions appear
truly voluntary (or as voluntary as any non-altruistic, compromise
agreement can be), and therefore not likely to be challenged.
In the second situation, an agency gives advice to a specific business
or a small number of similar businesses, usually in the context of a
regulatory or quasi-regulatory action. The resulting negotiations may lead
to a form of administrative equity (such as a waiver, exception or
declaratory order) which the business voluntarily seeks out and which is
then binding or strongly persuasive on the regulated party.72  In contrast,
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 931 (1994); Yoriaki Narita, Administrative Guidance, 2 LAW IN JAPAN 45 (1968);
Yeomans, supra note 66; Young, supra note 14.70 Spaeth, supra note 69, at 934.
71
Two recent U.S. EPA initiatives are examples. The 33/50 program is a voluntary pollution
prevention initiative that seeks to achieve substantial reductions in the volumes of specified chemicals
released or transferred off-site per year by industry. The EPA initially solicited 600 companies; eventually
1,135 companies pledged to reduce targeted pollution. See Margaret Rosegay & Mehran Massih,
Environment, Health and Safety Voluntary Programs, 474 PRAC. L. INST./LIT 617, 619-21 (1993). The
Environmental Leadership program provides special recognition to manufacturing companies that are
committed to prevention-oriented environmental management that goes beyond mere compliance with
regulations. Individual plants can be designated as Model Facilities if they meet certain criteria and
subscribe to a Corporate Statement of Environmental Principles. Id. at 621-24.
72 Exceptions, exemptions and waivers are voluntarily sought when the applicant wants to be
released from a rule that would otherwise apply. The ensuing decision is then binding on that particular
applicant. Declaratory orders and advisory opinions often involve an applicant's request for a
determination as to whether a regulation applies to certain facts. The ensuing decision is not binding, but is
persuasive agency action. Aman, supra note 68, at 672-76.
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when a business seeks a license or permit, the advice often comes in the
form of conditions which the agency suggests to the applicant, and to which
the applicant then "voluntarily" agrees. The resulting commitments are thus
the product of the subtle bargaining relationship between the agency and the
business. They impose specific, individual requirements shaped by the
needs of the particular regulated entity.73  In such a situation, ky6tei or
environmental protection agreements are simply written compilations of
these suggestions, voluntarily adopted by the business.
2. Enforceability of Site-Specific Administrative Guidance
Japan's Administrative Process Act ("APA")74 was passed in 1993,
partly in an attempt to curb agency abuses of adminstrative guidance.
75
Prior to its passage, the judiciary often refused to review administrative
guidance. The APA, while not setting up any absolute standards, does
proclaim fundamental principles to apply for administrative guidance:
compliance is voluntary, guidance must clearly state its content and aim and
may not exceed statutory authority, and the administrative bodies must
make procedural rules publicly available. 76 However, local government's
administrative guidance, when not based on national statutes, is exempt
from even this circumscribed level ofjudicial review.77
Because local government's kyttei are specifically exempted under
the APA, a court must rely on the pre-APA analytical structure to determine
if judicial review of administrative guidance is appropriate. 78 First, only
"administrative dispositions" and similar exercises of public power are
justiciable under article 3(2) of the Administrative Case Litigation Law. 79
Second, Japan's Supreme Court has limited "administrative dispositions" to
73 Aman, supra note 68, at 677.
74 Gy6sei Tetsuzuki H6, Law No. 88 (1993).
75 Lorrenz Kodderitzsch, Japan's New Administrative Procedure Law: Reasons for its Enactment
and Likely Implications 11-12 (June 1993) (unpublished manuscript, available at University of Washington
School of Law, Gallagher Law Library).76 Id at 40-41.
77 Id at 26. Article 38 of the APA does admonish the local authorities to respect the spirit of the law
when alplying administrative guidance. Id. at 27.
Ichiro Ogawa, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Actions in Japan, 43 WASH. L. REv. 1075, 1078-
86 (1968) (reasonably clear discussion on this judicial inquiry).
79 GydseiJiken Sosht, Law No. 139 (1962).
VOL. 5 No. 3
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGREEMENTS
those administrative acts that "immediately and directly create or delimit
private rights and duties."80 Because only a final and formal official act
directly creates legal rights and duties, mere advice is held to be unrelated to
any question of public law, and hence unreviewable by direct appeal.
Courts often take at face value the assertion that a company "voluntarily"
implemented the agency's advice.
However, courts may mitigate this result where the impact of the
administrative guidance is severe or where the fiction of voluntary
compliance is implausible. For example, in a 1972 case a plaintiff who
wanted to build a gas station in a protected part of Kyoto was informed by
the City Planning staff that extremely restrictive requirements would
apply. 8 After withdrawing his application because he was unable to meet
the stiff requirements, the plaintiff was outraged when another developer
built a gas station in the same spot without meeting the requirements. The
plaintiff sued for compensation, and the court held that the city's advice,
although not illegal, did amount to an "exercise of public authority" under
the National Compensation Law.82 Thus, plaintiffs may have access to the
courts, but only through damage actions.8
3
Finally, even if the kyrtei is found to be an "administrative
disposition," the plaintiff must prove that the agency exceeded its scope of
discretion in giving the advice. This is usually evaluated in terms of the
authority granted to it by the relevant statute.84 However, because relevant
environmental statutes are often vague, it is possible to find even very
specific administrative guidance falling within that discretion. If kyjtei are
nothing more than written administrative guidance, the typically deferential
attitude of the courts leaves both parties of a violated agreement without any
legal recourse. The agency can not enforce compliance, and the private
80
Decision of Feb. 24, 1955, Supreme Court of Japan, quoted in Frank K. Upham, The Legal
Framework of Japan's Declining Industries Policy: The Problem of Transparency in Administrative
Processes, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 425, 430 (1986).81 Young, supra note 14, at 959. The gas station's proposed site was in a special area designated for
its scenic beauty, and the city wanted the gas station's design to conform to aesthetic specifications.82 Also called the State Redress Law, Kokka Baisho Ho, Law No. 125 (1947). Article I states that
"when a public servant, in the course of his employment in an exercise of public authority of the state...
causes harm to another person, either intentionally or negligently, then the state or public body has a
responsibility for compensating the loss."83 John 0. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law: Introduction, 19 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 11-13 (1986)
(use ofdamage actions to gain judicial review of administrative actions).
Upham, supra note 80, at 452.
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enterprise can not recover damages for the impacts of unreasonable
"requests."
C. Ky~tei as Enforceable Contract
Although ky6tei may be viewed as site-specific administrative
guidance, it is more likely that they are enforceable private contracts.
Widespread compliance with ky6tei provisions precludes a clear
jurisprudential basis for treating ky6tei as contracts. As evidence, in the few
reported cases, courts have tended to evaluate each clause of the agreements
independently, and clauses which are clear, specific and reasonable were
upheld as contractual obligations.8 5  As further support for this contract
view, courts in other countries have interpreted similar environmental
protection agreements or covenants as private contracts.
8 6
1. Ky~tei Satisfy the Requirements of a Civil Law Contract
At the risk of oversimplification, the Japanese civil law doctrine
requires two criteria to create a contract. The first ("formation reijuisite") is
mutual assent evidenced by reciprocal declarations of intention. ° 7  Unlike
the common law approach, bargaining is not considered to be an essential
85
Shibaike, supra note I1, at 83. Shibaike reports, for example, that a court upheld a clause in a
kyotei between a town and an electric company which simply stated "no major facilities can be expanded
without the town's consent."86 European countries have been actively experimenting with various forms of environmental
contracts for many years. Government-polluter agreements in the former East Germany were treated as
civil law contracts by the courts, despite the fact that the private enterprises were compelled to enter into
the contracts on the basis of the 1965 Contract Act, and were subject to economic sanctions for
nonperformance of the specified environmental improvement measures. See Peter H. Sand, The Socialist
Response: Environmental Protection Law in the German Democratic Republic, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 451, 471-
72 (1973). The Dutch Basic Metal Industry covenant, concluded in 1992, has been deemed by some
commentors to be a civil law agreement enforceable by the courts, Peter J.J. van Buuren, Environmental
Covenants Possibilities and Impossibilities: An Administrative Lawyer's View in ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS, supra note 9, at 49, while others have said that it is not a civil law contract,
Rene van Acht, Comment to ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS, supra note 9, at 45.
Denmark has addressed this controversy by passing legislation which gives the Minister of the
Environment the authority to enter into civil law contracts with polluters. Ellen M. Basse, Environmental
Contracts: A New Instrument to Be Used in the Danish Regulation of Environmental Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS, supra note 9, at 220.87 WARREN L. SHATTUCK & ZENTARO KITAGAWA, U.S./JAPANESE CONTRACT AND SALE PROBLEMS
114 (1973) (course materials, available at the University of Washington School of Law, Gallagher Law
Library) (explanation of the technicalities of Japanese contract formation, including the significant issues
arising from untranslatable terms).
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element, so courts do not need to find a mirror-image "offer" and
"acceptance." Rather, the courts look for clear, reciprocal declarations of
intent.88 This intent to form a contract must be objectively manifested,
tested by taking the perspective of the person who received the declaration
of intention.
8 9
Ky6tei appear to satisfy this requirement. Both parties consent to the
agreement. The written nature of the kyotei,90 as well as the rather lengthy
negotiations which typically preceed its formation, are persuasive evidence.
Although a permit applicant may be somewhat at the mercy of the local
government, one could argue that the applicant has waived her legal right to
challenge by voluntarily accepting the condition or signing the agreement.
Once the formation requisite is satisfied, the contract remains invalid
until the second criteria, "validity requisite" is met. This criteria
encompasses concepts such as capacity, good faith, fraud, duress, mistake
and so forth.9 1 On the most fundamental level, these concerns are expressed
by the broad good faith principles of article 1 of the Japanese Civil Code.92
More specifically, a contract which is induced by threats of harm may be
construed as wrongful under Civil Code article 96, 93 especially if the court
is willing to expand the definition of harm to encompass economic harm.
The court must be alert to this problem of duress, as there is potential for the
municipality to exert undue influence while acting in its fiduciary capacity.
Such a determination is clearly a fact-specific inquiry.
There is no civil law equivalent to the common law concept of
"consideration." The civil law's emphasis on the reciprocal nature of the
declarations of intent differs from the common law's focus on bargaining as
the essence of contract. Thus, it is not necessarily problematic for an
agreement to consist solely of the private enterprise's promise to comply
with more strict environmental conditions, without specifying what the
88 Id. at 152.
89 Id. at 160.
90 But see Sawada, supra note 62, at 182 (Contracts in Japan typically serve more as a memorandum
of agreement between parties rather than as a legal document to be enforced.).
SHATtUCK & KITAGAWA, supra note 87, at 114.92 THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN (1972) article I states: "(1) All private rights shall conform to the
public welfare; (2) The exercise of rights and performance of duties shall be done in faith and in
accordance with the principles of trust; (3) No abuse of rights is permitted."
93 THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN (1972) article 96 states in pertinent part: "A declaration of intention
induced by fraud or duress may be avoided."
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municipality will do in return. Some justification ("cause") for the
municipality's actions, even if merely inferred, may be sufficient.
94
2. Are Ky(tei Violations of the "Rule of Law"?
As described above, a court might void a kyjtei for lack of
reciprocal/mutual intent or because it was negotiated under duress,
depending on the specific facts of the case. On a more general level, using a
private contract to further the administrative responsibilities of an agency
creates a new issue: whether a private contract neglects the "rule of law."
Many Japanese commentators 95 have objected to kyttei-as-contract
because they think it violates the "rule of law."96  If one agrees that
privately negotiating a public law contract violates the rule of law, then the
municipality must remedy this through one of two ways. It may pass an
ordinance that authorizes the agreement as an official administrative action.
While some cities and prefectures have passed ordinances authorizing the
conclusion of ky6tei,97 they are apparently uncommon.
Alternately, the negotiation process itself must provide sufficient
opportunity for public input to make it substantially equivalent to a rule-
making procedure. Ky6tei negotiations often provide significant
opportunities for either formal or informal citizen involvement in decision-
making. 98  As previously noted, some kyjtei consist solely of private
enterprise-citizen negotiation, and even the private enterprise-local
government negotiations often involve citizens groups as witnesses or
94
SHATrUCK & KITAGAWA, supra note 87, at 217-18.
Shibaike, supra note 11, at 70 ("rule of law" in administrative guidance context), 84-85 ("rule of
law" as applied to ky5tei, citing other Japanese commentators); Narita, supra note 69, at 60-64 ("rule of
law" in administrative guidance context).96 The "rule of law" is the belief that norms which affect the rights and obligations of citizens are
only valid when crafted under a legislative or delegated mandate. Such a concern is raised whenever
governmental decision-making has no substantive opportunity for public input, because of the assumption
that the resulting decision lacks accountability. Critics of this "bartering rationality" are also concerned
that it preserves inequality of application of the law, and prevents their structural re forms. See Gerd
Winter, Bartering Rationality in Regulation, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 219 (1985) (explaining bartering
typol 0ies, and criticizing the view that bartering is as legitimate as law).
Most ordinances simply direct a specific private enterprise to conclude an agreement. Others may
specify substantive limits on the contents of kydtei, or procedures to follow for public input. Shibaike,
supra note 11, at 86.
8 Rehbinder, supra note 19, at 152.
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parties. Given the lower due process expectations in Japan, 99 this level of
involvement could approach or even exceed that provided during
rulemaking. Where, however, the sensitive nature of the negotiation
prevents even de minimus public involvement, a concerned citizen would
need to resort to political pressure to invalidate or add specific clauses to the
agreement.
If the issue is the failure of the municipality to enforce an existing
kyjtei, citizens could potentially take direct action by suing as a third party
beneficiary. 00 The citizens' groups would have to demonstrate that they
have standing-that the agreement was developed with the intent to benefit
them.101  If the standing issue could be settled satisfactorily, the citizens
would need only to show that the terms of the agreement were being
violated in order to obtain the specific performance of the contract.
10 2
D. Judicial Enforcement of a Ky6tei Analog in the Land Use Arena:
Outline Guidance
Another foundation for a jurisprudential analysis of kyatei can be
analogized from the courts' treatment of "Outline Guidance."'1 3  Outline
Guidance has been used in Japan since the 1950s by municipalities, in order
to direct negotiations with real estate developers to control the height and
design of high rise buildings. Although minimal national standards for
building construction existed, the laws did not require any consideration of
ventilation or sunlight. Local governments, constrained from developing
their own regulations because of national preemption, and under
considerable pressure from local citizens, developed their own building
standards. The governmental agencies backed up these "voluntary"
99 See generally Nathanson & Fujita, supra note 46 at 274-84 (historical background on
constitutional basis for due process rights).100 This option has an interesting analogy in the civil rights arena in the United States. See
generally Arthur R. Block, Enforcement of Title VI Compliance Agreements by Third Party Beneficiaries,
18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1983).101
"Where a party to a contract has agreed therein to effect an act of performance in favour of a
third person, such third person is entitled to demand such act of performance directly from the obligor."
CIVIL CODE (1972) art. 537.102 But see Shibaike, supra note 11, at 89 (discussion of Judgment of 1980, Sapporo District Ct., 37
HANREI JIHO 196, regarding group of fishermen who attempted to enforce a kydtei as a third party
beneficiary but was denied standing).
103 Outline Guidance is examined in depth in Young, supra note 14, at 926-33, 960-65.
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requirements with threats to withhold vital water and sewage services, or
the construction permit itself, if developers failed to negotiate in good faith.
Outline Guidance differs from kytei only in the role of the local
government. With Outline Guidance, an agency does not directly
participate in the negotiation, but encourages the developer and the
surrounding residents to directly and privately bargain. The city simply tilts
the power balance by giving the citizens an important bargaining chip: the
building permit will not issued without the residents' consent. Direct
involvement by residents is essential for Outline Guidance because the
residential needs, patterns and preferences for sunlight and ventilation vary
so much from one block to another. Nevertheless, Outline Guidance and
ky6tei can be considered functionally equivalent, under the assumption that
governments are simply representing citizens during kyjtei negotiatons.
Fortunately for our understanding of ky~tei enforcement, Outline
Guidance has been challenged several times,' ° 4 and the courts have taken a
unique approach to interpretation. One of the best examples is Yoshida v.
Nakano Ward.10 5  There, the court first agreed that, as long as the
developer's plans conformed to the law, the city could not refuse to issue a
construction permit or supply water, based solely on the developer's refusal
to comply with non-binding guidance. The court said that the city had
nevertheless advanced the regulatory goals of the Construction Standards
Law (i.e., to establish minimum standards for the site and structure in order
to protect life, health and property). The court then made a leap in logic,
finding that the statute's public welfare purpose supported a generalized
duty to attempt to resolve conflicts within the authorities' jurisdiction.10 6
There were however, two requirements: the city had to base its decision on
the "common sense of society,"'0 7 and both parties had to bargain in good
faith. If the city refused to issue the permit, it might be liable for damages
due to unnecessary delay. Thus, although the city could not directly
condition the issuance of the permit or the provision of services on explicit
104
In addition to Yoshida v. Nakano Ward, see also Young, supra note 14, at 964 (discussing
Judgment of 1979 (Nakatani Honten G6meigaisha v. Tokyo), Tokyo Ct. App., 955 HANREI JIHO 73); at
971 (discussing Judgment of 1975 (Yamaki Kensetsu Kabushiki Kaisha v. City of Musashino), Tokyo
District Ct., 803 HANREI JIHO 18); at 983, n.151 (discussing Judgment of 1978 (Jurakuen Yfigen Kaisha v.
Nakano Ward), Tokyo District Ct., 931 HANREI JIHO 79); and at 983, n. 156 (discussing numerous cases).105 Judgment of Sept. 21, 1977 (Yoshida v. Nakano Ward), Tokyo District Ct., 886 HANREI JIHO
15, discussed in Young, supra note 14, at 960-63.
106
Young, supra note 14, at 962.
107
Young, supra note 14, at 962.
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standards for sunlight or ventilation, it could condition it on the parties'
willingness to negotiate.
IV. LEGAL CHARACTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGREEMENTS
Environmental protection agreements, the U.S. counterpart of kyitei,
may also be characterized in three ways. First, they may be completely
non-enforceable, as purely relational undertakings. ° 8  Second, they may
constitute an informal agency action with enforceability dependent on the
statute, limits to agency discretion, and the views of the court; this view is
examined in the next section. Lastly, they may be contracts that are fully
enforceable as negotiated. In order to understand whether the courts will
enforce environmental protection agreements, this Comment will explore
the judicial treatment of development agreements, the U.S. equivalent to
Outline Guidance.
A. Environmental Protection Agreements as Informal Advice
The doctrinal structure of the Japanese courts in evaluating the
legality of administrative guidance is closely paralleled by U.S. court
reviews of informal advice. First, the court will often determine that the
guidance is non-reviewable because it is not an "agency action,"'109 the
equivalent of Japan's "administrative disposition." Second, even if it does
qualify as an agency action, the court may find that the action is not ripe for
review because it isn't final."10 Finally, even if the action is deemed to be
108 This aspect was discussed in the Japanese context, and will not be further explored here.109 The U.S. Administrative Procedures Act defines an agency action as including the "whole or
part of an agency rule, order or... failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1994). An order is "the whole or
part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking ...." 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)(1994/i0
The U.S. Administrative Procedures Act states that "final agency actions for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994). In Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), the Supreme Court presented a methodology for
determining ripeness for review: balance the fitness of issues for judicial determination against the
hardship to the party if judicial review is withheld. A factor to consider in determining whether an issue is
fit for review is the finality of the agency action. Courts often find that staff actions, such as interpretive
letters and oral advice, are not ripe for review because they have no legal effect, are not authoritative, and
might prompt the agencies to restrict the availability of informal advice. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at
148-49. See, e.g., National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698-700
(D.C. Cir. 1971). Courts are reluctant to review informal advice even when the language seems to convey
veiled threats to regulatees that they must conform to the agency's non-binding policy statements. See,
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ripe for review, the courts might still find that the action falls within a
permissible range of agency discretion under the relevant statutes.III
However, a U.S. court may be less tolerant of a local government's
informal advice when that advice is marginally or wholly ultra vires.
112
Without authorizing legislation, local governments in the United States may
find it difficult to emulate the success of local governments in Japan in
extending their jurisdictions to new sources of pollution by "gap filling,"
using only their generalized supervisory authority. Although local
governments in the United States typically lack the fully panoply of
administrative authority held by federal and state agencies, it is possible that
a combination of zoning authority, police power, local ordinances, and
traditional common law nuisance principles could provide a sufficient basis
for extending advisory jurisdiction over a wide range of environmental
problems.'13
B. Environmental Protection Agreements as Contracts
Common law contract theory requires some of the same elements
(albeit with slightly different terminology) as civil law contracts. The
element of voluntary consent remains critical, and in enforcing an
environmental protection agreement a court will certainly inquire whether
e.g., Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F. 2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See generally Howard L.
Vickery III, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action: A Case Study of Shareholder Proposal No-Action
Letters, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 307, 337-45 (1976); 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD G. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 3 84-90 (3d ed. 1994).Ill
Agency actions are unreviewable when they are "committed to agency discretion by law."
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1994). However, the Supreme Court has narrowly read
this language to mean that review is precluded only "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). In
determining whether there is "law to apply," courts look at the governing substantive statute for a standard
to evaluate any claim of arbitrariness. For U.S. environmental statutes, which tend to be prescriptive, it
would almost always be possible to find law to apply. Courts also look at the precise allegations made by
the plaintiff, and thus this test for reviewability begins to look like a decision on the merits and fully
reviewable. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chancy, 52 U.
CH. L. REV. 653, 653-57 (1985).
112
The state may delegate a portion of its powers for the protection of the property, health and
comfort of the public to a muncipality. EUGENE MCQUILLIN ET AL., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 9.01 (3d ed. 1988). Usually, though not always, such delegations are restricted to those
matters of local concern. Id. § 4.13.113 See Peter H. Lehner, Act Locally: Municipal Enforcement of Environmental Law, 12 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 50, 66-80 (1993).
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duress existed.' 14 Both parties must exhibit an intent that the contract be
binding, such as is demonstrated by putting it in writing.
Two common law contractual requirements which apply to
environmental protection agreements, but which in Japan are subsumed
under the general requirement of good faith, are consideration and pre-
existing legal duty. In an environmental protection agreement, a reasonable
argument can be made that both sides supply consideration. For the private
party, consideration takes the form of compliance with stricter standards.
The municipality's consideration may be less obvious, or may be merely
implied, but as in Japan could include the promise of public support, access
to land via zoning approvals, or provision of services.
These environmental protection agreements might be deemed invalid
if either party actually has a pre-existing legal duty to do the negotiated
act. l 5 The court will examine whether the company, either directly or
indirectly, is required under law to perform the type of actions which they
are promising. If the agreement calls for conditions which are truly more
stringent than the legal requirements, this should not be an issue. However,
the court might find that the municipality had an implied duty to permit the
development of facilities, or to provide necessary public services. 116 Most
modem courts have moved away from the view that the business has a
vested right, based on ownership alone, to receive a permit or services.117
Whether or not a duty exists will depend on the enabling statutory language,
in conjunction with the amount of discretion delegated to the service-
providing or permit-issuing body. i11 Finally, even if there is no statutory
pre-existing duty, the private enterprise might have a valid promissory
114
"Undue influence is unfair persuasion of a party who is under the domination of a person
exercising the persuasion.... If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by undue influence by the
other Faty,, the contract is voidable by the victim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1981).
"The performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject
of honest dispute is not consideration; but a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what was
required by the duty in a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 73 (1981).
116 State and local laws in the United States often contain a "duty to serve" provision which directs
privately-managed utilities to connect eligible users; such laws may need to be amended to clarify that the
duty to serve can be conditioned on compliance with an express agreement. See, e.g., MCQUILLIN, supra
note 112, § 34.89.117
"[Wihile some courts and commentators persist in the traditional view that there exists an
almost inviolate right to develop.., it would be more accurate to say that.., the private development right
contracts as the public exercise of the police power expands." Richard B. Cunningham & David H.
Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L. J. 625, 632 (1978).
Id. at 638-39.
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estoppel claim if significant preparations have been made prior to denial of
permit or services.119
C. Judicial Enforcement of an Environmental Protection Agreement
Analog in the Land Use Arena: Development Agreements
It is possible to infer from the U.S. courts' approaches to
development agreements and similar land use arrangements whether
environmental protection agreements may be enforced. Development
agreements are a form of land use exaction 12  limiting the uses of new
residential or industrial developments. In exchange for these limitations,
municipalities promise to grant the zoning status which might otherwise be
denied, preserve regulatory status for a particular period of time, or provide
certain municipal services. 12 1  "Development agreement" as a term of art
refers to those agreements negotiated in states with authorizing statutes; 122
however, similar negotiations can also occur without state statutory
authority in the form of annexation agreements, settlement agreements or
stipulated judgements.
Development agreements, like ky6tei, possess a hybrid contractual-
regulatory legal character. An examination of the relevant legislative
119 The strength of the promissory estoppel claim will depend on whether the permit or service
relates to the government's proprietary or sovereign activities, the conduct of the permittee and whether
recognition of the claim implicates important public policies. Id. at 650-53.
Land use exactions are techniques used by local authorities to compel a developer to exchange
land, money, materials or services for permission to develop. On-site exactions require the developer to
provide for amenities within the development, such as sewers, streets or open space, while off-site
exactions typically require improvements on land adjacent to the property. Michael H. Crew, Development
Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 US. 825 (1987), 22 URBAN LAW. 23, 23-
26(1990).
121 Id. at27.122 Several states and countries have passed legislation specifically authorizing the use of
development agreements. The following state descriptions are available: California (CAL. GOV'T. CODE §
65864 - 65869.5) (1996) (Gov't), discussed in Eric Sigg, California's Development Agreement Statute, 15
Sw. U. L. REV. 695, 703-07 (1985); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3220-43 (1986)), discussed in David
S. Goldwich, Development Agreements: A Critical Introduction, 4 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 249, 254-57
(1989); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. 46-121 to 46-132(1986)), discussed in Judith Welch Wegner, Moving
Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements and the Theoretical
Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 997 (1987); Nevada ( NEV. STAT.
278.010-201 (1985)), discussed in Wegner, supra, at 998. Washington's statute (WASH. REV. CODE
36.70B.170-210 (1995)) is too new to have developed commentary. Denmark and Belgium have both
passed similar legislation. See Hubert Bocken, Covenants in Belgian Environmental Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRAcTs AND COVENANTS, supra note 9 at 57-71; Jesper Jorgensen, Legislation on
'Eco-contracts' in Denmark, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS, supra note 9, at 73-85.
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language, circumstances of use and expectation of the parties reinforces the
view that development agreements are functionally contracts.1 23  On the
other hand, the purpose and effect of the agreements is distinctly regulatory
in nature. 124 Unfortunately, like ky5tei, it may take some time for the legal
character of development agreements to be entirely clarified by the courts,
due to a similar tendency towards widespread compliance.
125
1. Threshold Question: Procedural Concerns
The secretive nature of development agreement negotiation may raise
questions of due process and equal protection, both in terms of the means
used to adopt the agreements, and the options for affected citizens in
challenging their implementation. 126  Such concerns parallel those raised
with ky~tei concerning the violation of the "rule of law." Development
agreement statutes typically define basic procedures for notice and hearing
for affected landowners. Localities without statutes may be wise to enact an
ordinance that mimics these procedures, as well as laying out eligibility
requirements, modification procedures, and so forth. 1
2 7
2. Threshold Question: Applicability of the Contracts Clause and
Reserved Powers Doctrines
Another complex threshold question which looms over development
agreements is the legitimate basis for the municipal authority to bind future
government actions. If the government's commitments limit future
environmental regulatory actions (precisely the sort of certainty the private
enterprise is seeking), then the development agreement might be invalid
under the reserved powers doctrine. 128  The reserved powers doctrine is
123 Wegner, supra note 122, at 999-1000. Another commentator has concluded that development
agreements are "simply a species of public contract." Goldwich, supra note 120, at 25 1.
124
Wegner, supra note 122, at 1000-0 1.
125 Sigg, supra note 122, at 712; Crew, supra note 120, at 28.
126 Wegner, supra note 122, at 1008.
127 The League of California Cities has developed a model ordinance for development agreements.
Wegner supra note 122, at 1009.
The reserved powers doctrine, first enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880), states that a government agency cannot contract away its right to exercise
its police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. See Goldwich, supra note 122, at
257-62 (discussion of reserved powers doctrine as it pertains to development agreements).
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itself in tension with the contracts clause, 129 which limits the power of states
to modify their own or other contracts.1
30
This Comment cannot elucidate all aspects of these doctrines as they
apply to development agreements; that task is left to others. It appears that
a court's characterization of the public-private relationship will influence
whether or not it finds the agreement to be contractual in nature; this
characterization involves an analysis of the legislative language, purpose
and effect of the government action, and the parties' expectations and
considerations. 131 Once it is deemed to be a contract, the court may base its
determination that the local government has bargained away its reserved
powers if the agreement lacks clear authority, the private enterprise's
expectations are reasonable, or the government action had an adverse effect
on the public interest. 132  If the government refuses to comply with the
agreement, the court may either deem it a routine breach, or may find that
the government has unconstitutionally "impaired" its obligations when non-
compliance is "substantial."' 133  Some governmental police power actions
that impair private contracts may nevertheless be allowed, if the actions are
found to be "reasonable and necessary."'' 34
Development agreement statutes have been carefully crafted to
answer these constitutional challenges. For example, while the California
statute authorizes any party to the agreement to enforce it against
subsequent contrary regulations, it also acknowledges the validity of any
other non-conflicting regulations, provides for periodic review and allows
129 The contracts clause declares that "No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the obligation
of Contracts .. " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
130 In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme Court set a higher
standard of review for public contracts (contracts between states) and a more deferential standard for
private contracts (between state and private entity). Some have seen this lack of constitutional protection
for private contracts as part of a jurisprudential trend against the valuing of contracts, whereby individuals
are not seen as autonomous actors responsible for their own decisions, but only as holders of certain
prescriptive rights and obligations not subject to contractual modification. See Thomas W. Merrill, Public
Contracts, Private Contracts and the Transformation of the Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 597, 624 (1987).
131
Wegner, supra note 122, at 965.
132 Wegner, supra note 122, at 967-68.133 Wegner, supra note 122, at 968-70.
134 Id at 974. The "reasonable and necessary" standard originated in United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), and was further defined in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234 (1978).
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for subsequent modification. 135 These are intended to show that, rather than
relinquishing all its police powers, the municipality is exercising its police
powers through the agreement. 136 Development agreements crafted without
the benefit of an authorizing statute may have some difficulty convincing
the court that the municipality has not surrendered control of its municipal
functions. However, applying the constitutional lessons of the contracts
clause, a clear public purpose and a demonstration of the necessity of the act
may help the court in finding a valid and enforceable agreement.
3. Legality of Bargaining Tools
Once these threshold questions have been resolved, courts will likely
adopt a case-by-case approach in evaluating the legality of the contract,
again looking in terms of whether there is adequate authority, the
expectations of the parties and the governmental interests. 137 As in Japan,
the courts would focus on whether the agreement is generally beneficial or
adverse to the public interest, and whether it compromises the government's
discretion.
a. Provision ofpublic services
Municipalities in the United States traditionally have had
considerable discretion in deciding the boundaries of the service areas when
siting facilities in newly developing areas. 138 Further, they have authority to
impose conditions relating to the operation of the facility, especially insofar
as it may affect the service provided. Courts examining the imposition of
these collateral conditions in government contracts sometimes distinguish
between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions.' 39  Applying this
distinction, courts have upheld collateral conditions in government contracts
with private parties that involve the provision of services, as long as the
135 Sigg, supra note 122, at 715 and accompanying notes.
136 Sigg, supra note 122, at 716.
137
Wegner, supra note 1220, at 1006.138 See generally Barbara A. Ramsay, Control of the Timing and Location of Government Utility
Extensions, 26 STAN. L. REV. 945 (1974).139 Governmental functions and powers are those which are used to administer the affairs of the
state, promote the general welfare and serve the public at large. Proprietary functions and powers relate to
the provision of services (often utility services) to customers in a manner analogous to private sector
entities. Wegner, supra note 119, at 1004.
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government is functioning in its proprietary capacity. Because private
concerns have traditionally been involved in providing water services,
courts have upheld these contracts because of their "proprietary" nature. On
the other hand, when the action is viewed as a "governmental" function
(e.g., provision of roads or sewage services) the contracts have been
overturned. 14  A court applying this distinction to a development agreement
could easily find a simple breach of a proprietary contract in case of non-
compliance by either party.'41
b. Access to land. zoning changes
When the government action in the development agreement is a
promise to change or continue a zoning practice, another complex
constitutional doctrine, the takings clause, must be considered. 4 3  Two
Supreme Court cases 144 have outlined strict limitations on these government
actions. The court looks to find a legitimate public purpose that allows the
government to entirely prohibit the proposed use, continued profitable use
of property for the landowner, and a clear nexus between the restriction
imposed and the purpose of the government act. Further, these criteria must
be met even when the landowner voluntarily agrees to or suggests the
condition. 145  Carefully crafted development agreements should
nevertheless withstand the court's takings inquiry even when these
140
Japanese courts make identical distinctions when evaluating government contracts. See, e.g.,
Judgment of Dec. 8, 1975 (Yamaki Kensetsu Kabushiki Kaisha v. City of Musashino), Tokyo District Ct.,
803 HANREI JIHO 18, translated in, GRESSER, supra note 1, at 216, 217-18; see also Young, supra note 14,
at 971-73. In that case, the court held that sewage services were an exercise of governmental authority,
whilerovision of water was not a governmental function, but a private law contract.
Wegner, supra note 122, at 1028.
142 The takings clause states that ... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compen sation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See extended discussion in Crew, supra note 120, at3 -42.
144 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the Commission demanded a
public easement across the Nollan's beachfront property, with the purported legitimate state interest being
to diminish the house's blockage of the ocean view from the roadway. The Court held this to be an
unconstitutional taking because there was no nexus between the required easement condition and the
purported state interest. Then, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct 2309 (1994), the Court quantified this
nexus by holding that there must be a "reasonable relationship" between the condition imposed by the city
and impact of the proposed development, in the form of a "rough proportionality." Id at 2313. In Dolan,
the Court found the necessary relationship between the conditions imposed (storm drainage and bike path
easements) and legitimate state purposes (prevention of flooding and reduction in traffic congestion).
145 Crew, supra note 120, at 37.
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limitations are imposed, and should assure that the agreement achieves its
purpose while minimizing harm.1
46
4. Implications for Environmental Protection Agreements
The evolving American jurisprudence on development agreements
does begin to resemble the Japanese courts' views of Outline Guidance, and
lead to the conclusion that environmental prevention agreement could be
developed and enforced within certain constraints. First, the courts might
look more favorably on agreements conducted with good faith and in which
there is "real" consent, as expressed in the expectations of the parties.
Second, the negotiation boundaries must not exceed the "common sense of
society": the agency's own interest is valid as long as it furthers the welfare
of all groups, not just special interests. In the U.S. context, the statement of
public interest must be clear. Thus, a written policy which conditions the
provision of public services or grant of a permit on collateral factors is
preferable to an informal discussion; a comprehensive plan that has
undergone authoritative review is preferable to the written policy; and a
statute would trump them both.
V. CONCLUSION
The Japanese experience with kydtei has reportedly been a positive
one for all concerned. It appears to be a pragmatic, effective and nimble
alternative to the behemoth of command-and-control regulation in the
United States. Environmental protection agreements will, however, face a
series of legal hurdles and undoubtedly some social resistance in order to be
applied in the United States. Their hybrid administrative-contractual nature
may be viewed with suspicion by conservative judges. Further, it is
difficult to determine whether the notoriously malleable "reasonableness"
standards of the contracts clause, reserve powers and takings doctrines
would help or hinder judicial acceptance of environmental protection
agreements.
Another hurdle is the widespread notion that government actions
which follow detailed and public procedures produce better, fairer results.
The Administrative Procedures Act is grounded on this belief, and U.S.
146 Crew, supra note 120, at 55.
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citizens are conditioned to expect significant opportunities for input. They
tend to view anything else as a "sweetheart deal" between industry and
government. Passage of authorizing state statutes or local ordinances would
assist to dispel this perception.
The remaining barrier is mistrust of local governments. Over the last
twenty years, counties and municipalities were perceived as ineffective
guardians of environmental health, because of the presumption that local
economic interests put pressure to compromise environmental standards.
However, historically, municipalities were the source of the first
environmental laws and at common law had a duty to protect public
health.147 Local authorities now bear most of the responsibilities for air
pollution monitoring and control, wastewater treatment and pre-treatment,
solid waste management and recycling, and even hazardous waste
controls.' 48 Furthermore, the trend is towards increasing decentralization.
The fact that environmental protection agreements are voluntary, and that
they are designed to impose conditions beyond the legal requirements,
should lessen the degree of mistrust in local government abilities to
effectively negotiate environmental protection agreements.
Bargaining is inevitable in the regulatory world. Environmental
protection agreements, modelled on ky6tei, would bring that bargaining out
into the open, and make the bargains more enforceable.
147 Lehner, supra note 113, at 54.
148 David L. Markoff, The Role of Local Governments in Environmental Regulation, 44 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 885, 892 n.14 (1993).
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